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In the Supre01e Court of the
State of Utah

FAIRFIEI.ID ffiRIGATION COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

NO. 7670

ERNEST CARSON AND MRS. ERNEST
CARSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Fairfield Irrigation Company, as successor in interest
to the original diligence users, is the owner of the flow of
Fairfield Springs for irrigation, culinary and domestic purposes, subject to whatever rights defendants have acquired
for stockwatering purposes, on which latter point the lower court made no findings.
The defendants Ernest Carson and wife own the lands
on which the springs arise and a considerable area surrounding them. Two wells, connected below the ground
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and therefore often considered as one well, the combined
flow of which is about 60 gallons. of water per minute, are
situated on a parcel of land belon~g to defendants, about
400 feet northerly from, and above, Fairfield Springs.
The springs and the wells are located just west of the
Town of Fairfield, in Utah County, Utah. The waters of
the springs are collected in a pond and flow easterly to and
below the Town of Fairfield. One of the springs is piped
for the culinary use of the inhabitants of the town. The
wells at the time of the institution of this suit were controlled by the defendants, at times being plugged and at
times being used for irrigation.
Defendants' EXhibit 15 contains a group of pict~es
showing the wells when they were plugged but when small
amounts of water were escaping through bullet holes in the
pipes. Defendants' Exhibit 17 is another view of one of
the pipes. Defendants' Exhibit 19 is an air view of the
pond area and channel leading to the east. Defendants'
Exhibit 21 is a close-up picture of one of the pipes. Defendants' Exhibit 18 is a view from the edge of the pond toward the location of the wells in question which are in the
vicinity of the telephone poles shown in tne picture. Defendants' Exhibit 16 is a view in the opposite direction from
the vicinity of the wells toward the pond, the head of the
Fairfield culinary system being shown in the foreground
(See T 440-450).
The right to the use of water from wells mentioned
is the principal subject matter of this controversy, each
party claiming such right. There are also involved the validity of plaintiff's application to develop additional waters,
claimed rights of way and claimed trespasses on defendants' lands.
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Plaintiff company brought action against defendant•
seeking, in the first count of its complaint, to have quieted
its claimed title to the use of the waters flowing from the
Fairfield Springs and from the two wells in question, the
source of which plaintiff claimed was interconnected with
the springs, and to have recognized its claimed right to develop additional water under Application No. 21275 filed
by it in the office of the State Engineer shortly before the
institution of the suit; in the second count to have defendans' title or interest in the waters of the two wells declared
to be held in trust for plaintiff; by the third count to obtain an accounting of profits from the leasing of such well
water by defendants (R 4-7). Defendants counterclaimed,
asking that its right to the waters of the wells, and its right
to use the waters of the springs on their own land for sockwatering, irrigation and domestic purposes to the extent
that they had been used in the past, and its title to the land
surrounding the springs and wells, be quieted as against
plaintiff, and that it be awarded damages for trespasses of
the officers and agents of the defendant company, with injunctive relief (R 19-21).
Plaintiff's claim to an accounting was dismissed, and
the trial court disregarded plaintiff's contention that defendants' title to the wells had been .acquired in trust by
reason of the complete failure of proof and the abandonment of such claim. However, findings were made to. the
effect that plaintiff was the owner of the springs and the
wells through usage; that defendants were the owners of
the land in question subject to an easement in favor of
plaintiff to go upon the channels leading from the springs
and from the wells (R 95-105). A decree was entered
quieting the respective rights so found, recognizing the
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claimed right of plaintiff as owner of Application No. 21275
to proceed thereon through the office of the State Engineer
to develop additional waters on defendants' lands, and enjoining the defendants from interfering with the flow of
the wells or with the asserted right of plaintiff company
to go upon defendants' lands along the water courses to
and about the springs and wells, and to remove obstructions within the water courses, and plugs or other obstructions upon or within said wells. Defendants were awarded nominal damages against the plaintiff for trespass beyond the easements found to exist, but the court refused
to grant defendants any injunctive protection against. threatened future trespass (R 111-114).
From the trial court's judgment the defendants have
appealed to this Court (R 117), it being maintained by
them that various findings are not supported by the evidence and that conclusions and the decree of the court
against the defendants are not supported by the findings
and are contrary to law. The defendants contend that they
arE' the owners of the wells as the owners of the land on
which the wells were driven and as successors in interest
to Sunshine Water Line Company, the ·admitted original
appropriators of the water therefrom; that this must be
deemed private water, and its use was never abandoned or
forfeited; that the plaintiff or its predecessors in interest
never made any valid appropriation thereof; that even
though it were considered that the water were public water and had been abandoned or forfeited by Sunshine Water Line Company or its successors prior thereto, the defendants by diversion and beneficial use through the Manning Gold Mines Company before 1935 validly appropriated it; that the plaintiff by usage, grant' or otherwise has
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acquired no interest in the water or in defendants' lands
for rights of way, or otherwise, except in connection with
the existing springs as distinguished from the wells; that
the plaintiff's application for appropriation filed in 1950
is subject to defendants' rights, if not entirely void and ineffectual; that while plaintiff is the owner of the flow of
water from the Fairfield Springs, this is subject to defendants' right for stockwatering purposes, and that the defendants are entitled to injunctive protection against the
plaintiff's threatened continued trespasses upon their land.
STATEMENT OF FACT
Plaintiff is a corporation organized in November, 1939.
It succeeded to the rights of diligence users from the Fairfield Springs initiated as early as the 1860's (R 95; Articles,
File 1449 received as Exhibit). The springs are numerous and are located on land owned by defendants (T 402403; Def. Ex. 2) in the South half of Section 29 and the
North half of Section 32, Township 6 South, Range 2 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, in an area over which the
water is impounded before being conveyed easterly for use
by the stockholders of plaintiff company, including defendtlllts. It appears that no development work was ever done
on the springs until 1949 when the pond was dredged and
enlarged by oral permission of the defendant Ernest Carson on conditions that were not complied with (T 57-59;
Def. Ex. 21). The springs yield a cornbined flow of between 4¥2 and 7 cubic feet of water per second (R 95).
The two wells in question respectively are located
433.8 feet north and 130.6 feet east from the section corner common to Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32 of Township 6
South, Rlange 2 West, and north 433 feet and east 122.6
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feet from the same corner; upon 1.9 acres of land which
defendants contracted to buy from D. L. Thomas in _1930,
the warranty deed from Thomas being dated April 14,
1930, but bing held in escrow pending completion of payments by Carson after the grantor's death (Def. Ex. 7;
File 5366 Probate in evidence). This deed covered the 1.9
acres of land "together with the water appurtenant and
belonging consisting of a flowing well". The two wells, by
reason of their interconnection underground, were commonly regarded as one well, and by mention of a well, the
two wells were intended (T 201-202).
The 1.9 acres of land was acquired by Sunshine Water
Line Company, a Utah corporation, from W. A. Sherman
and wife on December 2, 1898 (Def. Ex. 2, p. 5), at which
time and up until the development work by the corporation there were no wells, springs or other indications of
water on the land, nor any channel leading from the position of the wells, the position of the wells being high and
dry (R 96; T 152-153, 192-195).
About the year 1900 the Sunshine Water Line Company drilled the two wells, which were connected with a
pipe below the surface of the ground. One of the wells was
approximately 80 feet deep and the other approximately
160 feet deep, and both tapped undergground water sources not connected with the Fairfield Springs, with sufficient pressure to flow over the casing at a combined rate
of approximately 60 gallons per minute, at which rate they
have continued to flow ever since except when plugged
(R 96-10-; T 384-386, 186, 291-292, 303, 397-398). The
wellse are 375 feet from the spring pond at its nearest, and
are 8¥2 feet higher than the water surface of the springs
(T 106).
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The flow of the wells by the Sunshine Water Line
Company was collected into a sump which had been previously dug by it, and from there the water was pumped
to a distant mining operation, and as long as this operation
continued none of the water ever left the land where it was
found except by a pipeline belonging to the company, and
the water was wholly and beneficially used by it continuously until 1905, when the pumping operations ceased (R
.97; T 160).
In 1905 the Sunshine Water Line Company failed to
pay taxes upon its pipeline and pumping equipment, and
on the 1.9 acres of land, and a certificate of tax sale was
issued. In 1909 a further certificate of sale for 1908 taxes,
added to the 1905 taxes, appears. There is a further certificate of sale for the 1909 taxes. So far as the record
shows, there was no May sale nor auditor's tax deed is~
sued (R 97; See Def's Ex. 2). The pipe line leading to the
Sunshine mine was removed sometime between 1905 and
1913, although the pump house remained on the property
until after 1913 (T 10-11, 233, 308, 432, 809). The well
water after 1905 flowed off the ·company's land, over land
owned by Ernest Carson's father (T 29, 39) and into the
spring area, where the well waters commingled with the
waters of the springs and were used at least from time to
time (T 12) by the water users from the Fairfield Springs,
including D. L~ Thomas (R 97; T 248, 338, 401) and perhaps the Sunshine Water Company (T 208).

On August 4, 1913, D. L. Thomas obtained a quit-claim
deed from Ultah County covering the 1.9 acres on which
the wells were situated (Def's Ex. 2, p. 14). Thereaft~r,
he brought an action against the Sunshine Water Line
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Company to quiet his title to the land, and obtained a decree on August 31, 1915 (R 97; Def's Ex. 2, p. 15).
From 1913 to 1930, during the time D. L. Thomas had
title to the land, and perhaps before, a standpipe was installed by him in connection with the wells, through which
the water flowed, at which Thomas, farmers, sheep men
and others filled their tanks for culinary use, without objection from Thomas (T 31-33, 167, 178, 200, 256-257).
Thomas claimed the wells and no one else claimed any
rights to them. Use of the water was presumably with
his permission (T 72, .82, 179, 200, 201, 275-276). The water which was not ta~en away in tanks by Thomas and others, or consumed by flowing on the area between the wells
and the springs commingled with the spring waters and
was used by Thomas and other users 9f Fairfield Spring
water for irrigation, although from time to time the water was shut off at the standpipe (T 12, ~1-32, 238, 248, 436437).
In 1930 Ernest Carson entered into a contract with
D. L. Thomas for the purchase of the 1.9 acres of land, including the wells, and the deed was placed in escrow (T
40). At that time the water from the wells was running
through a single standpipe, and the wells were generally
referred to as one well (T 402). The deed described the
1.9 acres and conveyed and warranted also the "water appurtenant and belonging consisting of a flowing well"
(Def's Ex. 7) .. Carson spread the water over his land lying between the wells and the springs and otherwise controlled it (T 55, 61).
On October 4, 1933, the defendant Carson entered into
a written agreement with the Manning Gold Mines Co., reciting that he was the owner of certain waters flowing from
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artesian wells at Fairfield and that the company was in
need of additional waters for the operation of its reduction
mill at Manning, Utah, said wells being on the 1.9 acres
O\vned by defendants. The right to the use of the well water, together with any additionally developed water, was
leased to the company for a period of ten years (Def's Ex.
2, pp. 23-24). This agreement, with a similar agreement
of lease to the same company from the administrator of
the D. L. Thomas estate, to be operative if Ernest Carson
did not complete his purchase agreement (which he did),
was approved and confirmed by the probate ·court of Utah
County on January 4, 1934 (Def's Ex. 2, pp. 16-22) and
in the same proceedings, the 1.9 acres of land and the wells
were inventoried as a part of the D.L. Thomas Estate, subject to defendant's contract of purchase (File 5366 probate
in evidence) .
The first use of the water at Manning, as indicated
by the power company's records, occurred in December,
1933, and the power was disconnected on August 1, 1937
(T 308). There is no question about the diversion of the
water during this period and that the water was used beneficially (T 434). After pumping to Manning ceased, it was
thought that the company might continue use of the water
at Mercur, but defendants learned to the contrary in 1939,
and since that time they have used and controlled the water as they have seen fit, keeping them closed, or using
them as they desired, except that they have ·capped the
wells during winters as the result of a visit of a representative of the State Engineer's office (T 26-27, 64, 374, 378379, 438-439) .
In about 1936 the defendants received notice that they
had to file a claim on their wells by a certain time. An
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underground water claim was filed under date of March
19, 1936, in the office of the State Engineer, with the assistance of a representative of the State Engineer's office,
who assisted in making out the claim. The claim refers to
only one well, but at that time both wells were interconnected and were considered as one well (T 45-46) . This
claim, numbered 10987 in the office of the State Engineer,
states the claimed flow of the well at 60 gallons of water
per minute, and claims the water for irrigation and for
stockwatering, domestic or milling purposes. Under general remarks, it states:
"The undersigned claims ownership of the above
described waters as a part of its freehold; that said
water is not in any event subject to appropriation as
public water, but that the undersigned may at its pleasure put such water to use, or otherwise dispose of it;
and the filing of the claim shall in no event or circumstance be construed as a waiver of any right by the
undersigned. This water is used for irrigation purposes when not otherwise used." (Def. Ex. 1).

Ever since the drilling of the wells in question, and
continuing up to shortly before the commencement of the
present suit, no persons other than Sunshine Water Line
Company, D. L. Thomas, and the defendants, during their
respective ownerships, have ever claimed water from the
wells, have ever exercised any dominion or control over
them, or have ever protested the control and use by defendants and their predecessors under claim of right, despite, full, complete- and general knowledge, both by public record and actual notice, of such claims and use (T 3334, 54-55, 72, 83, 94, 179, 188-192, 201, 204, 219, 275-276,
298-301, 334, 336-337, 269, 373, 394-395; Def. Exs. 1, 6,
14; Probate file 5366).
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Less than a month before the present suit was instituted, plaintiff filed purported Application No. 21275 to
appropriate ten second feet of water from "Fairfield Spring
area." A large tract of land is described, including the
wells, and designated a "spring area", and it is proposed by
the application "to appropriate all of the water from the
springs and spring area and from the wells, which has not
heretofore been appropriated." It is further proposed under said application "To develop new water which is not
no\v issuing from the "spring area". Most of the land described belongs to the defendants (Pl. Ex. "'C").
In this statement, we have been unable to follow very
closely the court's Findings of Fact, since so many of them
are mere argument, or conclusions of law. The foregoing summary, consisting largely of facts concerning which
there is no dispute, but a number of which have been slanted or ignored by the court's findings, should be sufficient
at the outset to enable the reader to obtain a general idea
of the controlling record.
In our Statement of Points, we shall refer hereafter to
the gist of the findings of the court which we do not believe to be justified by the evidence and to the conclusions
and decree of the court which we claim to be unauthorized
and contrary to law. We shall also set out additional important facts, with references to the record, under the various headings of our Argument.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

1. The court erred in failing to find that defendants
were the owners of the wells and well-water in question,
as successors in interest to Sunshine Water Line Company;
and that Findings Nos. 10, 11, 12, 22 and other purported
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Findings indicating the contrary, are not supported by the
evidence; and that the court's Conclusions Nos. 2, 4, 7 and
11, and paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 10 of the Decree to the effect that plaintiff and not defendants is the owner of such
water, are not suported by the Findings, nor the evidence,
and are contrary to law
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the court's
Findings 7, 9 and 10 to the effect that Sunshine Water
Line Company abandoned or forfeited the wells or the water therefrom, and that Conclusions of Law No.6 and paragraph 9 of the Decree to the same effect are not supported
by the evidence, nor the Findings, and are contrary to law.
3. The evidence is insufficient to support the court's
Findings 12, 16 and 22 that plaintiff or its predecessors by
usage since 1905 have diverted, beneficially used and appropriated the waters of the wells and that Conclusions 2,
7, 10 and 11, and paragraphs 2 and 10 of the Decree, recognizing such claimed appropriation, are not ·supported by
the evidence nor the Findings and are· contrary to law.
4. The court erred in failing to find, irrespective of
whether the well-water was private water or had been or
had not been abandoned or forfeited, that the defendants
and those in privity with them, made the first lawful diversion and beneficial use of said waters, as underground
waters, and duly appropriated, diverted and beneficiallly
used said waters as underground waters prior to 1935 and
prior to the time any rights of plaintiff or its predecessors
could have attached; and in failing to conclude and decree
that defendants are the owners of the right to the use of
the flow from said wells, and that the court's Findings
Nos. 12, 13, 19 and 22 to the contrary are not supported
by the evidence, and Conclusions Nos. 4, 7 and 11, and
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paragraphs 2, 5, 10 and 11 of the Decree are not supported
by the Findings or the evidence and are contrary to law.
5. The court erred in its Findings Nos. 14, 15 and
17 to the effect that defendants had acqquired no vested
right to have the well water flow in its existing channel,
or rights in the springs except as stockholder of plaintiff
company; but that the plaintiff by reason of its ownership
of the water from the well, and past usage, had acquired
various rights of way or other rights in the defendants'
lands and in the pipe, caps, casings and other property of
defendants, to enter, maintain, repair, remove and otherwise exercise dominion and control over the same; that
such Findings are not supported by the evidence and that
Conclusion No. 11 and paragraphs 6 and 10 of the Decree
on the same subject matter, and granting plaintiff an injunction against interference by the defendants, are not
supported by the evidence or the Findings and are contrary to law.
6. The court erred in its Findings 17 by limiting the
trespasses found to have been committed by plaintiff to
one or two occasions, and in failing to find repeated trespasses by plaintiff and the threat of continued trespasses
against their property, and in failing to conclude and decree that defendants were entitled to injunctive relief
against plaintiff in the vindication and protection of their
property rights.
7. The court's F1indings 12, 18 and 19 to the extent
that they assume to recognize the validity of plaintiff's
Application No. 21275 or the right to proceed on plaintiff's
land thereunder, are not supported by the evidence, and
that Conclusion No. 7 and paragraph 3 of the Decree on
the same subject, are contrary to law and are not supSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ported by any Findings of Fact; that the court eiTed in
not finding and concluding that the said application as the
basis for any rights upon defendants' lands except in existing springs, was and is contrary to law, unauthorized and
V<?id, and in any event, is sub~ect and inferior to the property rights of the defendants in and to their lands, the said
wells and the water therefrom,
The foregoing points, under corresponding headings,
will be discussed in order.
ARGUlVIENT

1. Uefendants o~ the wells and the right to their
flow as successors in interest to Sunshine Water Line Company whether such right be regarded as an appropriated
right or as an incident to the ownership of the land itseH.
It was stipulated that the right to the use of the water issuing from the wells was owned by Sunshine Water
Line Company (R 46). This company drove the wells and
installed in .the ground the physical .material comprising
them. It had title to the ground. No means for interception or diversion of the water were ever installed by plain·
tiff or its predecessors in title.
D. L. Thomas acquired title to the land from Sunshine
Water Line ~c·ompany by tax deed from .Utah County and
through a suit to quiet title (Def. E·x. 2). He installed a
standpipe leading a short distance .from the wells {T 167,
168, 178) which was the only addition ever made to them
other than by the defendants. This physical equipment
was a part of land. The well water was made available on
the land thereby, as there were no surface waters (T 178).
The wells were appurtenant to the land and formed a part
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of it (Findings 8, R 98). They passed from Sunshine Water
Line Company to D. L. Thomas. Reid v. Reid, 112 Cal.
274, 44 Pac. 564.
Ernest Carson received a warranty deed from D. L.
Thomas covering the land in question, "together with the
water appurtenant and belonging, consisting of a flowing
well" (Def. Ex. 1). The two wells were interconnected
below the ground and were considered one well (T 45-46).
The defendants still own the land on which the wells are
situated and surrounding land, and there is neither findings nor evidence that they ever transferred the wells or
the flow therefrom; the undisputed evidence being that the
wells were considered as being separate and apart from
the Fairfield Springs (T 38, 43, 54, 55, 278, 279, 286, 296297, 337-338, 414-417, 421-431, 473-474, 475).
We thus have involved wells on defendants' lands, acquired by them prior to 1935, tapping underground sources
not connected with any other land so far as the record discloses. There is no proof whatsoever that the water is
from an artesian basin extending off that land, but it is
apparent that at the time the defendants acquired their
title, prior to 1935, the source of the wells was percolating
water under any concept.
It is unnecessary to cite the numerous Utah cases on
percolating water, prior to 1949, and particularly prior to
1935, since in the latter year, Wrathall v. Johnson, et al,
86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 755 and in 1949, Riordan v. Westwood,
___u.
, 203 P.2d 922, exhaustively reviewed
the decisions. Riordan v. Westwood points out (p. 925)
that until Wrathall v. Johnson in 1935, "the decisions of
this court treated th~ waters of artesian basins as percolating waters, and as such ,fue ownership went with the
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owner of the ground where such water was located and
were not considered to be subject to appropriation." With
respect to percolating waters in general, the Riordan case
states (P. 924):
"This court throughout its history has recognized
that percolating waters are not public waters but belong to the soil through which they pass and are the
property of the owner thereof, and are not the subject of appropriation (Citing numerous authorities)".
The conclusion is then arrived at by the court that under the present concept percolating watrs are public waters and subject to appropriation, and the comment is made
(p. 927) that "The question of what water is subject to
appropriation must be determined on our present standards and concepts and we must treat that question as
though our concepts and standards had always been as
they are now." The case did not involve water developed
prior to 1935, but an application was filed with the State
Engineer in 1946 to appropriate the water from an undeveloped seep and was based upon legislation enacted since
1935 (pp. 926-927). As applied to the case at bar, the
last quoted comment of the Court is dicta, and· has no ·application to it.
Prior to 1935, ~at the time when the defendants and
their successors in interest, for valuable consideration, obtained title to the land on which the wells were drilled, the
unbroken line of decisions of this Court, universally recognized in legislation and practice, was to the effect that the
waters of the wells were private waters belonging to the
owners of the land. Such decisions and practice were rules
of property, on the basis of which numerous property
rights, including those of defendants, had vested. The apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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lication of the changed .concept to such vested property
rights would throw titleS into confusion and would deprive
persons who had bargained for, and secured, rights thereunder of their property without due process of law.
The rule of judicial decision as precedence is treated
in 14 Am. Jur. "Courts", Sec. 59-84, pp. 283, et seq. The
rule in effect is the application of the doctrine of estoppel
to court decisions. It finds its support in the sound principle that when courts have announced, for the guidance
and government of individuals and the public, certain eontrolling principles of law, or have given a construction to
statutes upon which individuals and the public have relied
in making contracts, they ought not, after these principles
have been promulgated and after these ·constructions have
been published, to withdraw or overrule them, thereby disturbing contract rights that had been entered into, and
property rights that had been acquired upon the faith ap.d
credit that the principle aru1ounced or the construction
adopted in the opinion, was the law of the land. Ibid, Sec.
60. The rule seems to apply with peculiar force and strictness to decisions which have determined questions respecting real property and vested rights. Ibid, Sec. 65; Douglas
v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677, 25 L.ed 968 is cited as an
application, wherein the Court said that the true rule is
to give a ehange of judicial construction in respect to a
statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and
existing contract rights that would be given to a legislative
amendment; ·that is to say, make it prospective, but not
retroactive.
We, therefore, maintain that under well established
rules of property applicable at the time, defendants prior
. to 1935 acquired not only the wells themselves but the
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right to the water therefrom and ever since have owned
said wells and have applied the water to ·a beneficial use.
The rights of rthe defendants, however, as successors
in title to Sunshine Water Line Company are not wholly
dependent upon the last stated proposition. If it assumed
that Sunshine Water Une Company obtained and held admitted rights to the flow of the water from the wells by
virtue of an appropriation, we contend that such rights
likewise passed to the defendants through D. L. Thomas
as successors in interest. Such appropriated flow would be·
likewise appurtenant to the land and would pass by the
transfers in the chain of title, there being no reservations
of the right to use the W!aters from the wells on such land.
Leman J. McKinney, who was one of the few of plaintiffs witnesses who knew ·anything about the early ·history
of the wells, admitted that Sunshine used the water, that
no one ever claimed to the contrary, and that Thomas
agreed to sell the land, including the wells, to Ernest Carson; that the witness was a user under the Fairfield Springs,
and that he didn't question Mr. Thomas' right to sell the
wells and knew of no one else who questioned that right
(T 92-93). McKinney further testified that he was one of
the app:misers of the Thomas estate !and as a part of that
estate appraised the 1.9 acres of land and the flowing well
·as a part of that estate (subject to defendants' contract to
purchase) (T 92-93). He said he had no reason to question Mr. Thomas' right or Ernest Carson's right (T 94).
William C. Thomas, the nephew of D. L. Thomas, who
was the only other plaintiff's witness who knew much about
the early history of the wells, was administrator of the very
estate through which Carson's purchase of the land an.d
wells was ·completed. He swore to the inventory of the
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\veils as the property of the estate, subject to Carson's con~
tract (Probate File No. 5366 in evidence.) He didn't know
anybody who was claiming any rights to the wells except
D. L. Thomas, and added that naturally the latter was
claiming them "or he wouldn't have bought them" (T 179).
The only theory under which the right to the waters
of the wells could be said not to have passed to the de:Cendants as successor in title to Sunshine Water Lines Company, the admitted owner of that right, would be that of
forfeiture or abandonment. This brings us to our next
point.
2. The right to the well waters was not abandoned
or forfeited by Sunshine Water Line Company or by D. L.
Thomas prior to its transfer to defendants.
The theory on which the lower court awarded the well
water to plaintiff is reflected in its Findings 7, 9 and 10,
to the effect that Sunshine Water Line ·Company ceased
using the water when it discontinued pumping in 1905, and
because it did not pay taxes on the pipeline or the land, it
evidenced an intent to abandon the waters; by its Conclusions and Decree that there was an abandonment and forfeiture of the waters by that company prior to the time
Thomas acquired the land ,and that the pl'aintiff and its
predecessors appropriated the abandoned and forfeited water prior to acquisition of title by defendants.
We shall show under the next heading that the plaintiff or its predecessors made no valid appropriation under
any theory, and thereafter that defendants by valid diversion, appropriation and benefici~al use of the underground waters of the wells did complete a valid appropriSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ation if they did not already have title as successors in interest to the original users. The latter propositions would
defeat plaintiff's claimed rights in the wells irrespective
of the question of abandonment. At this point, however,
we submit that the water was neither abandoned nor forfeited by Sunshine, nor by Thomas, and that, therefore,
the right passed to the defendants as their successors in
interest. This alone would be sufficient to reverse the decree of the trial ~court.
Ch. 108, Sec. 52, p. 160, Laws of Utah, 1905, refers to.
one who "abandons or ceases to use water for a period of
seven years''. In the event specified therein the ''water
reverts to the public and can be again appropriated a:s provided in this act; but questions of abandonment shall be
questions of fact and shall be determined as are other questions of fact.''
We again refer to the principle discussed under the
preceding heading, that the waters of the wells under the
rules uniformly applied prior to 1935, were not public waters. It is clear that the statute cited has reference only
to public waters, since it mentions "reversion to the public.'' The wells and the flow thereof could be abandoned
or forfeited under the statute no more than the land of
which they formed a part. If there were an abandonment
of the water it would be not to the public or any other individual but to the owner of the land himself, as a part of
his freehold. Percolating water was deemed part of the
soil, even more so than the casings and pipes themselves.
The ownership· of the latter was an incident to the ownership of the freehold, as was the right to flow percolating
water through it. The intentions of the Sunshine Water
Uine Company and the effect of their acts or omissions
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must be judged by the rules of law as they were uniformly
applied as of that time. Its vested property rights nnder
such rules was involved and they could not be deemed to
have been lost by virtue of the statute.
The application of the foregoing principles seems fatal
to plaintiff's position. However, for the moment, let it be
considered that the waters of the wells must be deemed
then to have been public waters. In such event we also
question the facts on which the claimed abandonment or
forfeiture is predicated, and we maintain that the Conclusion and Decree are at variance with the evidence, not justified even by the Findings, and are contrary to law.
After Sunshine quit pumping there was a caretaker,
and D. L. Thomas was supposed to have the land in charge
before he bought it (T 30). He was a water user under
the Fairfield Spring system from 1905 to 1930 (T 401),
and during that time, he with other water users used the
entire stream in turns. It was 6 or 7 years after Sunshine
quit pumping that the pipe was all taken up (T 233). Following 1905 the wells were either capped or were used by
various farmers and others to fill their tanks, or pernrltted
to flow into the Fairfield Spring pond and from there
used by Thomas and others for irrigation. It is true that
the record shows a tax sale certificate, covering the pipeline and also the land for 1905, but it also shows tax sale
certificates covering the same property as late as 1909 and
1910, assessed against Sunshine Water Line Company. In
the application to appropriate No. 21275 (Pl. Ex. "C"), filed
by plaintiff's predecessor in interest, it appears under "Explanatory'' that ''The water from the wells was used for
a short period of time in about 1910", and that it was after
this that the water was claimed to have been abandoned.
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On August 4, 1913, D. L. Thomas received his deed from

Utah County (Def. Ex. 2). The pump house built for use
by the Sunshine Water Line Company remained on the
land until after D. L. Thomas acquired it (T4432). He
hauled water away from the wells and let other people do
so (T 31-33). He put in a standpipe to fill the tanks and
it is elear that the use by others, whether to haul away for
culinary purposes, or for irrigation through the Spring
pond, was permissive (T 31, 167, 178, 179, 200, 201, 275276, 456, 457).
Abandonment and forfeiture are not favored, and permissive use by others of water inures to the benefit of the
true owners and prevents the operation of the statutes dealing with abandonment. Zezi, et al v. Lightfoot, et al, (Idaho) 68 P.2d 50. On the other hand, a forfeiture does not
occur as long as the appropriator, or an adverse user, is
using the water since forfeituer is not favored. Wellsville
East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104
U. 448, 137 P.2d 634. Whether use through the spring pond
and by hauling the water away was adverse or permissive
as regards the Sunshine Wate·r Une Company, it appears
that there W)ould be no forfeiture or abandonment. A
change of nature or place of use, even though unauthorized,
does not involve any forfeiture or abandonment of the
right. Rocky Fiord Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir
Co.. , 104 .U. 216, 140 P.2d 638.
There was no abandonment or forfeiture whether the
waters be deemed priViate or public waters. The court
based its Conclusionu largely upon the failure of the Sunshine Water Line Company to pay taxes. It would be a
dangerous doctrine, indeed, if every person who let his
taxes go delinquent, or let other people use his water when
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he did not need it, or caped his wells whether at the request of the State Engineer or on his own volition, were
held to have abandoned or forfeited his water right. We
do not think that on the evidence or under the law, plaintiff, which had the burden of proof, made out a case of
forfeiture or abandonment. Moreover, even though the
statutory period had elapsed, the defendants as owners
resumed use of the water before other rights attached as
will hereafter be shown, and their rights therefore should be
recognized. Wagoner v. Jeffery, et ux, (Idaho) 162 P.2d
400.
8. The plaintiff or its predecessors in interest did not
validly appropriate the flow of water from the w.ells by
usage, there being proved no intent to appropriate, no diversion, and no beneficial use other than a mere permissive
one under the owners of the right, and since, in any ev~nt,
any purported appropriation was of surface waters after
they had lost their underground character, with no applimtion being filed in the office of tbe State Engineer until
after defendants' rights from every standpoint had become
vested.
In Wrathall v. Johnson, et al, 86 U. 50, 40 P.2d 755,
the essentials of a valid appropriation, apart from the filing of an application, are summarized in the following
words, (p. 785) :
"The law in this western ·country has always been,
and we think it now is, that the essentials of a valid appropriation of water consist of, first, an intent to appropriate and use, however manifested; second, an actual construction of diverting works, followed by an
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actual diversion of the water; and third, the application of a definite quantity of the water to a useful and
beneficial purpose.''
There was never any intent to appropriate and use the
w·ell water by the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff
company. The two witnesses produced by plaintiff who
were best acquainted with the history of the wells and who
were both users under the Fairfield Springs, admitted that
they didn't question Mr. Thomas' right to the wells, that
they didn't know of anyone else who did or who was claim..
ing any rights to the wells when Thomas owned them (T
92, 93, 179). The first time anyone ever questioned the
defendants' right to the well water was in the Fall preceding the institution of this suit (T 54-55). It was generally
known through the Town of Fairfield and among the water
users that the defendants claimed the well water and was
leasing it, and no one ever questioned this right or made
any protest (T 219, 236, 275, 394-395). There was never
any intent manifested in any way to appropriate the well
water as a part of the springs, and ever since Sunshine began using the well water, it was never considered a part of
the springs (T 38, 43; also citations in "Statement of
Fact").
There was no construction of diverting works or any
diversion by the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff,
or by the plaintiff. Whatever water was used by the spring
water users from the well found its way off defendants'
land and down into the springs without any act, construction of works or effort of any kind on the part of the lower users. There is not even a suggestion in the record that
the company or those whom it claims under, during the
time the trial court found the water had been apropriated,
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or at all, \vent upon defendants' land in the vicinity of the
wells, to turn water down or to uncap the wells, or to make
any channels or to do any other act whatsoever that might
be interpreted as a diversion. The record is conclusive
that any use made by plaintiff or its predecessors in interest was a permissive use in recognition of the rights of the
owners of the wells. Under such circumstances the necessary elements of a valid appropriation just are not present,
either as a matter of fact or as a matter of law, even assuming that the water in question was public water and
subject to appropriation as such during the time the court
found it had been appropriated, which we deny.
Moreover, the plaintiff and its predecessors, to the extent that they used the well water at all, did so as surface
water, and had to appropriate it, if at all, under the rules
aplicable to such surface water flowing in natural channels. Particularly, if it be contended that diverting works
were already constructed below the springs, it is apparent
that the water diverted therefrom did not at such point
retain its character as underground water so as to be subject to appropriation between 1903 and 1935 without the
filing of an application before the State Engineer.
The party having the burden must rely upon the
strength of his own title. He must show in such case all
appropriation by application to the State Engineer unle~
his appropriation was before 1903, which it is undisputed
was not the case with respect to plaintiff's claimed rights.
Wellsville East Field liT. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock
Co., supra. In Wrathall v. Johnson, supra, it is clearly indicated that surface waters, or waters flowing in well defined channels, can be appropriated after 1903 only through
application filed with the State Engineer. Peterson v.
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Lund, 57 U:. 162, 193 Pac. 1087 indicates that in acquiring
the use of water flowing from springs, their source in percolating water is not ·controlling and it must be appropriated as surface water in the place where ~diverted.
If sub-surface streams flow in clearly defined -channels, or if water developed by another is permitted to flow
into a natural stream and is abandoned by the developer,
it can then be apropriated by another only in compliance
with the law of appropriation governing surface streams.
Harriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah, 69 Pac. 719.
It seems implicit in the opinion in Lehi Irrigation Co.
v. Jones, _ _ _u
, 202 P.2d 892, that when diversions are made of surface waters they must be filed upon
by application before the State Engineer, irrespective of
where or how they originally are supplied---Jwhether by
foreign or developed waters, seepage or otherwise- and
that though they might be appropriated as a surface flow,
this does not mean that the original owners may not recapture them or withhold them in proper ~cases. Also, in
the case of Silver King Cons. Mining Oo. v. Sutton, 85 U.
97, 39 P.2d 682, it is indicated that water reaching a stream,
lake or other source and constituting the supply from
which it may be diverted, and which reaches the point of
diversion by movement from the natural source or ar,tificial source so remote as to be considered a natural source,_
is subject to the law of appropriation governing surface
streams.
The waters of the wells through the spring pond ·could
not be appropriated by plaintiff by usage as underground
water, but if appropriated at all in the manner claimed by
plaintiff, this would have to be through ·an application in
the State Engineer's office. No application was filed by
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plaintiff or its predecessors until plaintiff filed Application
· No. 21275 on January 5, 1950. We next refer to the rights
of the defendants accruing in the meantime.

4. Should it be considere.~ that defendants did not
have any vested right to t~ waters from the wells t~ereto
fore and that they were public waters, defendants by completed appropriation of them as underground waters
through diversion and use at Manning and otherwise prior
to 1935, validly appropria~ the entire flow and ever since,
defendants have maintained said right and are the exclusive owners thereof.
As pointed out heretofore, the deed from D. L ..Thomas to Ernest Carson, dated 1\lpril 14, 1930, specifically
conveyed the land as well as the water from the wells.
Ever since the defendants thus acquired the land and wells
in 1930 (Mrs. Carson in this brief being indicated as a joint
owner for ·convenience, although her record interest is that
of a wife), they have in good faith claimed the wells as
their own, eontrolled the water as they saw fit, paid all
taxes on the land, used the water f.or the irrigation of about
an acre of land next to the wells and used, with other users
under Fairfield Springs, any excess water that got into the
springs from the wells (T 55). They· not only capped the
wells at times, but spread the ·water on their land and built
diversion ditches as far back as 1930 for use on their land
between the wells and springs (T 61, 375, 392-393).

In 1933, defendants entered into a lease of the well
waters with Mann·ing Gold Mines Company and this com·pany used the water constantly under the defendants for
milling pwposes from 1934 until at least 1937 (T 51-52); its
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pumps, connected directly onto the wells, were running
generally 24 hours per day. The agreement of lease, dated
October 4, 1933, recited that Ernest Carson was the owner
of certain waters flowing from artesian wells at Fairfield,
and that the -company was in need of additional waters for
the operation of its reduction mill at Manning, .Utah. The
water was leased to the company for a ten-year period, with
option to renew for an additional tenyears (Def. Ex. 2, pp.
23-24). This agreement, with a similar agreement from
the administrator of the D. L. Thomas Estate, to be operative in the event Ernest Carson did not complete his purchase of the wells ( whieh he did) , was included in an approving order of the probate court and recorded on January 26, 1934, in the records of the County Recorder of Utah
County, as shown by pages 16-24 of Def. Ex. 2 {T 418).
After the company quit pumping in 1937, it was until1939
supposed that it would make further use of the water at
Mercur. The wells were capped when Manning discontinued its operation, and since 1939 they have been capped
_, more than they have been uncapped-in the Winter, particularly, at the request of the State Engineer (T 26-27,
378-379, 437-439).
In connection with this reference to the State Engineer, it should be mentioned that in 1936 the defendants received notice that they had to file a claim on the wells by
a certain time. The claim was filed (Def. Ex. 1) through
the agent for the State Engineer's office, who helped make
it out.. This underground water claim No. 10987, dated
March 19, 1936, shows the claimed flow at 60 gallons per

minute, and claims the water fur irrigation and for stockwatering, ·domestic or milling purposes. As pointed out
heretofore, the claim expressly alleges that the water is a
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part of the freehold, which gives force to the idea that defendants were then relying upon the established rules of
property hereinbefore mentioned.
The court, in its Findings, goes to great length in an
effort to explain why no one objected to defendants' leasing of the well water (R 104). The inference seems to be
that since water was scarce and the farmers had nothing
to do, they consented that Carson might dispose of their
water for his own profit. If the matter were simply to
make possible the leasing of the water and if it were considered that the Fairfield Springs users in general owned
it, there should at least have been some slight indication
to this effect during all the years that Carson utilized and
controlled the water W1der claim of right. Reference is
made to the testimony of W. C. 'rhomas (T 188-192), now
allied with plaintiff, that he knew his uncle claimed the
wells; that he sold them to Carson; that the witness, himself, as his uncle's administrator, claimed the wells for the
estate subject to Carson's rights and agreed that the estate leased the wells to Manning Gold Mines Company if
Carson did not go through with his contract to purchase.
It was generally known throughout the town that he
claimed the wells (T 204, 419-420) and the spring users
never questioned his rights or made any protest to him
(T 219, 236, 276, 394-395). The Court's purported finding
is mere unsupported argumentation.
There is another interesting and significant phase of
the record which shows conclusively that the spring users
or the plaintiff corporation, during the time Carson was
leasing the water and thereafter, never had nor ·claimed
any interest in the waters of the wells. It appears without dispute that the well waters were better for culinary
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purposes than even the waters from the springs which were,
and are, being piped to the users (T 296). It also appears
that .all of the spring users in 1935 held a meeting to decide
upon drilling a well or wells for ·culinary use; yet, there
was not even a suggestion made that defendants' well:s were
under their control. Defendants' Exhibit 6, identified as
the minutes orf the meeting in the handwriting of the secretary (T 334, 412-413), shows:

---

"Meeting called to order at 8 p.m. on March 20,
1935 by Abel Evans; Ralph Dubois was elected chairman, Leone ·Carson, secretary. A. Evans gave a report of their visit to the drouth relief com. . . . .
Mr. Evans asked how we could maintain a pressure
pump. Different ideas were given about the pressure
system and the present system. It was moved and
seconded to vote on the pressure system or the present system for a flowing well. . . . . We voted
by a secret ballot. The voted numbered 1 for for pressure system, 5 for present system, 12 for flowing well.
Mr.. Evans moved that the well be driven on the ballpark. The motion carried." (T 476-483) .
As far as anyone knew, a tie to the Carson well was
not even suggested (T 336-338), even though considerable work on the ·culinary system from the spring was done
as late as 1939. The culinary system of the springs users
was installed in 1911 (T 318) and replaced about 1939. The
flow of the wells-·60 gallons per minute--was adequate
for these culinary needs; yet, neither in 1911 when the culinary system was installed nor at any time since, did the
spring users attempt to utilize the well waters for their
culinary needs, although as above mentioned, they considered the drilling of another well.
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Ever sin~ 1930, the defendants have used the water
either through their lessee, through others making permissive use of the same under them, through watering their
land between the wells and the springs, and whenever the
water has got into the springs, through use of the full
stream during their turns. They have also had complete
control of the wells and have worked with them, repaired
and capped them under instructions of the State Engineer
and as they have themselves determined, all with the recognition, knowledge and acquiescence of the plaintiff and
its predecessors in interest.
If the well waters were public waters, the

defe~dants

were the first and only valid appropriators thereof subsequent to their use by Sunshine Water Line Company.
They, only, actually went upon the ground and diverted
the water as underground water through works bolonging
to, and controlled by, them; they, only, had the intent and
purpose to appropriate and beneficially use said water as
underground water and they, only, actually applied the water to the full extent thereof through the years to a beneficial purpose. All of the elements of a valid appropriation were present prior to 1935, as well as since, and if the
waters in question are deemed public waters, the recent
case of Hansen v. Salt Lake City,
U.
, 205
P.2d 255, shows that the defendants duly appropriated them
as underground water prior to 1935 and that they have
priority over the recent application filed by plaintiff with
the State Engineer. We quote from page 261 of this decision:

"We do not have to determine whether the doctrine of the Hooppinia case is correct or not because
here the facts are different. We, therefore, conclude
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32
and hold that the right to the use of underground
waters which prior to the Wrathall case were not considered the subject of appropriation, but which· were
therein held to· be subject thereto, could be acquired
prior to the 1935 enactments and amendments of our
statutes on that subject by merely diverting such waters from their natural source and placing them to a
beneficial use and that the plaintiff had, prior to the
filing of the appUcation of the ·city with the State Engineer acquired a vested right to the use of the waters
flowing from his well to the extent that he had placed
them to a beneficial use as hereinbefore indicated, and
that by filing his ·claim to such right to use such waters in accordance with the 1935 statute he has established that right with a priority dated from his first
use.''
5. The court, without evidence or reason, awarded
the plaintiff rights of way over defendants' ground; the
use of the wen casings and other appurtenances and other
rights which it had never established; while o~ the other
hand, it erroneously denied defendants even the right
to have the well water flow in its existing channels and
.the right for stockwatering from that channel or the
springs.
Findings 14, 15 and 17 of the trial court are to the
effect that defendants have acquired no vested right to
have the wen· water flow in their existing channels or any
rights in the springs except as stockholders of plaintiff
company, and that, on the other hand, by reason -of plaintiff's ownership of the water from the well and past usage,
it has acquired adverse rights in defendants' lands and the
right to use and control the pipe, caps, casings and other
property of the defendants in ·connection with the well and
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to enter, maintain, repair, remove and otherwise exercise
dominion and control over the same.
There is really no Finding of Fact as distinguished
from argwnent or conclusions justifying the result in this
respect; no prescriptive use is shown, no grant from the
defendants or their predecessors in title and no other basis
of the asserted right is indicated; yet, the decree grants
plaintiff an injunction against defendants' interference ·with
such unauthorized use of their property.
When the spring area was dredged in 1949, some of
the stockholders talked with the defendant, Ernest c·arson,
and Carson told them that they could clean the springs
out if they would take care of the dirt and that he would
furnish them a place to dump it. They did not say "no"
or "yes" (T 58-59), but later, in Carson's absence, they enlarged the pond and left the . dirt piled up on the banks
without disposition of it (T 57-59; Def. Ex. 21).
What right by grant, ·Way of necessity, or otherwise,
in defendants' lands does the record show plaintiff to
have acquired? The plaintiff or its predecessors never
asserted any right in, or used the ditch leading from, the
wells. This was not a natural channel; there was no channel or other evidence of water when Sunshine Water Line
Company began its. development work, as pointed out in
the Statement of Facts herein. The company has never
before asserted any rights in defendants' lands above the
springs and has never sought to utilize any such rights.
If one passively receives water flowing or draining off another person's land, does he thereby acquire an interest in
such land? If so, there would be few irrigated areas of
the State which would not be· encumbered by rights of way
for the passage of waste water, overflow or seepage. There.
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is simply no evidence upon which the rights of way up to
the wells can be predicated, or on which an injunction
against defendants can be based.
Equally unfounded is the court's Finding No. 16 that
by reason of plaintiff's ownership of the water from the
wells and "past usage", it has the right to go to the source
of the well water and to repair the diversion works or open
valves upon the pipes on the wells leading to the surface
which may have been, or may be, placed thereon by defendants or anyone else, and that neither it nor its agents
shall be liable for trespass so long as they go upon the channel as the same may be reasonably necessary to reach the
source of the water. This is hardly a Finding of Fact with
respect to the basis of such asserted rights; but if it were,
and even though it supported the ·Conclusions and Decree
virtually condemning defendants' land and property without compensation, it would not be based on any facts estabHshed in the record. Rights of way or other easements
in land cannot be so acquired. The court in effect has
made plaintiff the owners of the very casings and pipes
forming a part of defendants' land, since it has given control over them, with t~e right to maintain and repair them
and since it has enjoined defendants from interfering therewith. This presents a strange anomoly, involving the furnishing to plaintiff of not only the water from defendants'
land, but the pipes, casings, valves and other property
necessary for its use.
The court gave the plaintiff the right to maintain the
present pond ·channel, whereas, there was no grant of any
right in defendants' lands or any acquisition of any right
by prescription for the enlarged pond area resulting from
the 1949 dredging.
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An easement acquired by prescription is always lizni ..
ted by the use made dwing the prescriptive period. Salisbury v. Rockport Irrigation Co., 79 U. 398, 7 P.2d 291. On
the basis of what adverse use can the award of the interests in defendants' land and property be justified? There
seems no justification whatsoever. A very late Washington case highlights the necessity of adversity in establishing prescriptive right, as well as the required period of
use. Sharp, et ux v. Keizling, 214 P.2d 163.

Plaintiff and the .lower court have circumvented the necessity of condemnation. There is no case here, such as Riordan v. Westwood, supra, where the entry on another person's land in an attempt to initiate an appropriation, was
made in good faith under the assumption that public land
was involved. We do not even have any prior entry
made or claimed until shortly before the comm~ncement
of this action. The land was, and is, known to belong to
the Carsons; no right of entry to, or around, the wells by
grant, prescription or otherwise was shown, and yet the
court assumed to freely award rights of way and related
rights in connection with the wells to defendants. If this
could validly be done for no better reason than here shown,
there would be no reason for condemnation proceedings,
and no point in the comment of the court in the last mentioned case when it said (p. 931) :
"Had defendant been notified or had reason to believe that this land was privately owned it would have
been his duty to proceed in accordance with Section
100-3-19, U.C.A., 1943, before entering upon the land
. . . . Had he deliberately gone onto the plaintiff's land knowing that he was committing a trespass,
it might well be that such trespass would nullify hii;
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right to appropriate this water, but under the circumstances here disclosed· such is not the effect.
"Of course the applicant cannot even under this
decision enter the lands of the plaintiff to further see
if he can develop this water right without either getting permission from the plaintiff or condemning a
rig-ht of way over the land and paying for all damages
which he causes therein."
In contrast to the liberality of the trial court in awarding to plaintiff rights and privileges on defendants' land,
consider the attitude of the court toward defendants' rights
even on the theory the court adopted. If the water had
actually run from the well down a channel over defendants'
ground for a long period of time, as plaintiff asserted as
a basis of its claim of usage, the defendants would at least
have had a right to a continuation of that flow by reason
of its beneficial effect upon their land between the wells
and the springs, irrespective of the other use of the water.
Riordan v. Westwood, supra., p. 930. Moreover, defendants established a stockwatering right which was not recognized by the court (T 16-17, 21, 141). Adams v. Portage·
Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 U. 1, 72 P.2d 648.
The court erroneously denied any such rights on the part
of the defendants. It did recognize that the flow of water
from the wells on defendants' lands irrigated a small area
beneficially (Finding No. 11). It made no finding whatsoever on defendants' claims to stockwatering rights, but
it concluded (Conclusion No. 4) that they had no rights
whatsoever in the springs or well e:x:cept as stockholders
of plaintiff company.
The reversal of the ·court's judgment and the award
of the wells and their flow to defendants will, of course,
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take care of many of these errors and inconsistencies. Yet,
even with the well waters confirmed in defendants, they
should have the right to maintain their livestock in the
vicinity of the springs, as they have in the past, and should
not be left to face the claim that since no stockwatering
rights were recognized in the judgment, they cannot in the
future run their livestock on their lands surrounding the
springs.
6. Repeated trespasses on the part of plaintiff were
shown both on land over which the court hteld that the
plaintiff had rights of way and on other land; it was also
shown, and effectually admitted, that plaintiff intended to
continue such trespasses. . The court therefore erred in
finding that only one or two trespasses had been committed, and in failing to award defendants injlUlctive relief to
prevent future threatened trespasses.

If this Court determines, as we think it will, that plaintiffs have no interest in the wells in question, all of its entries upon defendants' land in the vicinity of the wells must
be deemed trespasses. In any event, no valid rights of way
to, or in, the vicinity of the wells were proved. Even though
it be assumed that plaintiff had acquired such rights along
the channels or, more accurately stated, along the artificial ditches leading up to the wells, the undisputed evidence
shows repeated trespasses beyond the scope of these assumd rights and a determination on the part of plaintiff
to continue such trespasses.
In plaintiff's complaint, broad rights of entry upon defendants' lands are asserted which were never sustained by
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ted to any channel (T 139-140, 370, 371-373). Defendants'
title was fully established (T 15; Def. Ex. 2) and confinned
by the court's Findings (R 112) .
The vice president of the plaintiff corporation testf..
fied that he, with the board of directors, despite their be-ing forbidden by Ernest Carson to do so, went on his
grounds ·in the vicinity of the wells, and he insisted at the
trial that he had the right to do so, and claimed that right
on _behalf of the plaintiff company (T 255-256, 257, 258).
Another officer testified that the agents of plaintiff have
been up to the wells with a wrench trying to turn the well
water on (T 328, 329). The attitude of plaintiff's agents
was that they should be permitted to go freely upon defendants' lands without even being observed by the Carsons (T 329, 330). The secretary of ~the plaintiff company,
up until the time of the trial, and particularly when the
complaint was filed, claimed the right to enter defendants' land around the springs and any part of it as he chose
(T 346). Another officer of the company, Smith, admitted that he and his fellow officers had been on Mr. Carson's
land around the wells repeatedly, not confined to any chaD:nel, and that this was without Mr. ~carson's permission and
that as an officer of the corporation, he still claimed the
right to do so (T 361-362). In fact, this officer expressly
testified that unless they were restrained by the court, they
intended to not only clean out the springs, but to enlarge
.the area of this work beyond such springs and to go on other parts of defendants' land and to go up toward the wells
and to dig up there at places where no one had ever dug
before (T 364-365) .
When plaintiff's officers were discovered on defendants' land they asserted their -claimed rights to be there
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notwithstanding that they were not along any channel (T
371-372). Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the corporation had no right to go on defendants' land other than in
the pond area and the channel draining the water therefrom, down to the Fairfield headgates (T 365-366).
Despite such record, the trial court contented itself
with finding one, or at the most two, trespasses were committed (Finding 17). As heretofore pointed out, the court
gave the plaintiff various rights in the defendants' land
above the pond and up to the wells, and as may now be
seen, refused to enjoin the violation of defendants' property
rights even at other places.
Repeated trespasses are a proper matter for injunctive relief, and when it is apparent that they may ripen
into an easement the court will readily grant an injunction.
28 Am. Jur., "Injunctions", Sec. 137, pp. 326-327. In this
connection, it is notable that the trespasses upon the land
of defendants referred to above were all within the year
or so preceding the trial and that prior thereto, plaintiff
had never manifested any interest in, or claim to, the wells
or rights of way in connection therewith. So, without the
passage of any prescriptive period, the court recognized,
and the plaintiff now claims, rights of way or easements
over defendants' lands. Unless plaintiff is enjoined, these
claims will multiply and enlarge, until defendants just as
well give up and move away. It should not be the province
of any court to cause, or suffer, any such violation of property rights. The court abused its discretion in failing to
grant defendants injunctive relief.
7. The application which plaintiff filed in 1950 not
only is subordina~ and subject to defendants' rights to
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the well water, but is ineffectual and void insQfar as it purports ~o secure a general right to the waters on or under
the land therein described.
Plaintiff offered in evidence, as its Exhibit "A", a certified ·Copy of Application 21275, filed in the office of the
State Engineer on January 5, 1950, by one B. Z. Kastler,
Jr., and assigned to plaintiff company. It was received in
evidence over defendants' objection, among other grounds,
that it was not such an application as ·can be made under
the law with any legal effect, and that the application was
simply an arbitrary designation of a "Spring area" in an
attempt to tie up all the water in that area, which in legal
principle, might just as well be the entire State of Utah
(T 5).

This applicaion described a large tract of land, the
greater portion of which belongs to defendants, which is
arbitrarily described as a 'Spring .area." The apparent object is to acquire or tie up all of the water on or under that
land and make impossible· any futuer development of water
on said· land by defendants or others.. We do not think
such an application is ·contemplated by 100-3-2, U.C.A.,
1943, as amended by Laws of Utah, 1949, concerning applications for the right to use unappropriated public water and their required contents. If one can control the
future development and use of the waters underlying a
forty-acre area by the mere filing of an application and
proceedings thereunder, he can do so with respect to 100
acres, or a whole county, particularly if he does not have
to relate his appUcation to specific locations, springs, channels or pipes. It is noted under "Explanatory" on the application in question that it is generally proposed, among
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other things, to construct "new drains ~and tunnels to develop new \Vater which is not now issuing from the spring
area."
The idea of plaintiff's engineer with respect to the
"Spring area" which he described, originated with what
he had been told by some persons whom he could not identify (T 107-108). His investigation disclosed no spring
area apart from the springs and seeps near the pond or
in the wash immediately to the north, which formed only a
part of the "Spring area" described in plaintiff's application. Plaintiff's Ex. "E", does not represent any actual
spring area, for it includes the old wells and sump, and
other points undefined, while the engineer admitted that
only where he marked "springs" on the map is there any
surface indication (T 12). He admitted that he furnished
the plaintiff a description to go into its application based
upon the area containing meadow or salt gmss, indicating
to him that it "might have ground water sufficiently near
the surface so as to make it profitable to channel to it
and drain it" (T 116-117). But even such grass land lying north of the springs formed only a small portion of the
area described in the application, which in large part is
actually no spring area, parti:cul:arly in the vicinity of the
wells (T 117, 124-125, 137). A substantial amount of land
within the described "Spring area" is sagebrush land without any evidence of water (T 138). He indicated that the
true spring area adready had been dredged which would
mean that it actually compriseQ merely the area under
the present pond.
The engineer's observations were made in December
and March and manifestly what was a seep area and what
was not, would be difficult for him to determine (T 125,
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127). He made no borings to determine the heighth of
the water table (T 128-219). Any evidence of surface water which he claimed to have seen in the vicinity of the
wells came from the wells, the depth of which he did not
know (T 129) .
The idea in surveying a description for the claimed
"spring area," according to the plaintiff's engineer, was to
make a description so large that they thought they could
cover every possibility of water development in the area
(T 1388). While the "Spring area" described in the application covers more than 40 acres (P. Ex. "C") the actual spring acre covers about an acre and a half to two
and one-half acres (T 148, 226).
The trial court's Findings 12, 18 and 19 assumed to
recognize the validity of plaintiff's application and the right
to proceed on plaintiff's land thereunder, and Conclusion
of Law No. 7 and paragraph 3 of the Decree adjudicate
the effectiveness df this application as against defendants.
Such an application should not remain unchallenged, either
by us or by this Court, for if the principle of it is accepted,
large areas 'Can be tied up, as plaintiff is seeking to tie up
defendants' land, and their water economy frozen or made
static for the speculation or profit of, or oppression by,
interests opposed to the individual land owner.
CO·NCLUSION
Sunshine Water Line ·Company was admittedly the
owner of the wells, their waters and the l~and on which they
were situated up to at least 1905. The wells were part of
the land, and the right to their flow was an incident of the
ownership of the land. D. L. Thomas acquired the title
of Sunshine Water Line Company by tax deed and through
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suit to quiet title. The defendant, Ernest Carson, acquired
the title of D. L. Thomas by warranty deed dated April 14,
1930, conveying and warranting the wells and the land, and
all of his rights vested prior to 1935. He has maintained
those rights ever since and owned, and had, possession of
the land, the wells and the water therefrom at the time of
the institution of this action. His rights were completed
and vested at a time when our courts as a rule of property recognized that percolating waters were not public
waters, but belonged to the soil, are the property of the
owner thereof, and are not subject to appropriation. That
rule was changed after 1935, but dicta in Riordan v. Westwood, supra, that the question should be treated as if this
new concept had always existed, can have no application
to the case at bar where the rights of defendants vested
under the old concept as an established rule of property.
There was no abandonment or forfeiture of the well water
by Sunshine Water Line Company or its successors since
the statute had no reference to private water and since
under any -construction the water was not, either in law
or in fact, abandoned and since if there were any temporary discontinuance of its use, such use was resumed by
the title holders before any other rights attached.
The plaintiff acquired no interest in the wells or their
flow because prior to 1935 the water was private water
not subject to appropriation and, even though it were
deemed public water, plaintiff or its predecessors made no
diversion, merely passively receiving such water flowing
into the springs, which as far as plaintiff or its predecessors
were concerned, was surface waters which could be. appropriated, if at all, only by an application with the State
Engineer, whi.ch it failed to file until after defendants'
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rights as appropriators of underground water attached
and became vested. Prior to the time any rights to the
flow of the wells attached other than the rights of the owners of the land, to-wit: in 1933, and continuing to 1937,
defendants, through their lessee, Manning Gold Mining
Company, actually diverted and pumped the water of the
wells and applied the entire flow to a beneficial use under
claim of right, thereby affecting an appropriation of the
water, as underground water, if the same could be deemed
public water.
The lower court not only erroneously failed to recognize defendants' rights in the wells, but refused to recognize their right to have the water flow as it has in the past
for the irrigation of their lands enroute to the springs, or
the right of the defendants for stockwatering, but on the
contrary, gave plaintiff leave to go upon defendants' lands
above the springs and in the vicinity of the wells and to
control and, in effect, appropriate the pipe, casings and
ether property comprising the wells-rights which it had
never asserted nor enjoyed before--and permanently enjoined the defendants from interfering with such encroachments. Making possible, and inviting, further encroachments in the future, notwithstanding undenied repeated
trespasses and the expressed intent to continue them on
the part of plaintiff's officers, the court refused to enjoin
plaintiff from committing trespasses even outside of the
elaimed rights of way of the plaintiff as recognized by the
court.
Finally, the court, in effect, recognized the plaintiff's
recent application before the State Engineer as giving it
the right to all of the underground water underlying a large
area of land belonging to defendants, without reference to
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any particular source or place, thereby virtually preventing any future development of water on their own land
unless, as we contend, such application is void and ineffectual as a matter of law.
Thus, these property owners have not only been deprived of the wells and the water therefrom, but the physical material making up the wells and appurtenances, the
control of their lands outside of the pond area which they
have enjoyed at all times heretofore, protection against
continued trespasses, the right to run and water livestock
on their land, and, in fact, all future possibilities of themselves developing additional underground waters unconnected with the wells or existing springs because of a general application seeking to reserve to plaintiff water development rights upon, or under, defendants' ground. Most
of the rights so given to plaintiff were never claimed, used
or even suggested by it until shortly before the institution
of this action in 1950.
The trial court unfortunately has committed grievous
error in this case. If those erros are permitted to stand
the property rights of the defendants will be confi·scated
unjustly. This being an equity case, the Supreme Court
should direct Findings, Conclusions and Decree to the effect that defendants are the exclusive owners of the wells
and the flow therefrom; that plaintiff has no rights in defendants' land outside the original spring pond area and the
channel leading toward Fairfieid therefrom, and that if
it wishes additional rights, it should acquire them by condemnation or purchase; that plaintiff be enjoined from trespassing upon the lands of defendants outside of the immediate original pond area and the channel diverting water
therefrom; that defendants have the right to water and
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maintain livestock on their lands adjacent to said pond, and
that the plaintiff's Application No. 21275 to the extent
that it purports to cover any water other than in, and underlying, the spring pond is void and ineffectual. Defendants also pray for their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
A. SHERMAN CHRISTENSON
for CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

